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Social Clubs and the Profit Motive Test:




Social clubs which qualify for tax exempt treatment under the In-
ternal Revenue Code (IRC or the Code) section 501(c)(7) form a
significant percentage of all tax exempt organizations in the coun-
try.1 Examples include country clubs, 2 equestrian clubs,3 flying
clubs,4 and the like. Such organizations are generally exempt from
taxation on income derived from dues, fees, or other amounts paid
by its members; however, all other club income obtained from any
other source, including investment income, is subject to tax as unre-
lated business taxable income.5 Against this taxable income, a social
club is permitted to deduct an aggregate of its allowable expenses
and is not required to match each item of expense to the correspond-
ing item of income.6 This Article focuses on the requirements for
deductibility of such expenses, and more particularly whether a so-
cial club may net excess expenses attributable to an income generat-
ing activity against income from passive investments.
* 1982 B.A., University of Florida; 1986 J.D., University of Florida; 1989
LL.M., University of Florida.
1. As of 1987, there were 56,216 social and recreational clubs qualifying for tax
exempt treatment under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 501(c)(7), comprising
just under 10% of the total number of tax exempt organizations. Treasury Department
Studies and Proposals (H. Ways and Means Comm., June 22, 1987), pt. 1, at 55.
2. See Tamarisk Country Club v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 756 (1985).
3. See Barstow Rodeo & Riding Club, Inc., 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351 (1953).
4. Rev. Rul. 74-30, 1974-1 C.B. 137.
5. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1989).
6. See id.
II. HISTORY
The tax on unrelated business income of tax exempt organizations
was first enacted in 1950.7 Prior to that time, the law was unsettled
as to the limits on tax exempt organizations earning income from
unrelated business activities. 8 As time progressed, it became clear
that some tax exempt organizations were engaging in businesses un-
related to their exempt purposes.9 These organizations were per-
ceived to be enjoying substantial competitive advantages vis-a-vis
their taxpaying business rivals by using their tax exempt status.10
As a result of the perception of widespread unfair competition,
corrective legislation was included in the Revenue Act of 1950. This
legislation forms the basis for the present sections 511 through 513
of the IRC which provide a tax on the unrelated trade or business
income of certain otherwise tax exempt organizations." However,
certain organizations such as social clubs were excluded from the
original tax and continued to be excluded until the Tax Reform Act
of 1969.12 The 1969 Act extended the unrelated business taxable in-
come concept to these organizations. Further, the Act included a
provision to tax certain investment income of social clubs. 13 This lat-
ter provision was a reaction to the burgeoning concern among many
members of Congress that such organizations were using untaxed in-
come from outside sources such as passive investments, to provide
pleasure or recreation to their membership.' 4
7. H.R. 8920, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
8. One early limitation on tax exempt organizations conducting such business
activities was the "destination of income" test, established by the United States Supreme
Court in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). The "desti-
nation of income" test provides that it is the destination and not the source of the income
which is the ultimate test of the right of tax exemption for the organization. Id. at 581.
This test was not easy to apply and led to much confusion among the federal circuits.
The wording of the Sagrada Orden opinion left room for more than one interpretation
and created some question as to its intended breadth. See, e.g., Samuel Friedland Found.
v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956) (where the court pointed out that the
Sagrada Orden court also spoke of the possibility that engaging in business pursuits in
competition with others might bring about the denial of the exemption for that tax ex-
empt organization); People's Educational Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d
923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964).
9. For illustrations of the extent to which tax exempt organizations were unfairly
competing with taxed businesses, see Revenue Revisions of 1950: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Finance United States Senate on H.R. 8920 An Act to Reduce Excise Taxes
and For Other Purposes, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 374, 846 (1950).
10. Id.
11. Revenue Act of 1950, Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906.
12. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. AND SENATE FINANCE COMM., TAX RE-
FORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3, at 27 (1969) [hereinafter
TAx REFORM STUDIES]. Other organizations which were included under the unrelated
business income tax at that time were churches and fraternal beneficiary societies. Id.
13. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1989).
14. See Rolling Rock Club v. United States, 785 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1986); see also
TAX REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12, at 316-17.
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III. TAXATION OF IRC SECTION 501(c)(7) ORGANIZATIONS
Social clubs organize and operate exclusively for pleasure, recrea-
tion, or other nonprofit purposes of like character and are generally
exempt from taxation under the Code so long as no part of the club's
net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or mem-
ber. 5 The purpose of this exemption is to allow individuals to join
together for recreation or pleasure on a mutual basis without incur-
ring greater tax liability than if they had acted on an individual ba-
sis.' 6 For example, if an individual purchased a horse for personal
pleasure and spent sums maintaining the horse, those sums would
clearly not be taxable as income. If, however, fifty individuals de-
cided to pool their funds to purchase several horses, then charge the
membership a fee per ride to cover the maintenance costs, such fees
would be considered income" in the absence of the section 501(c)(7)
tax exemption.'
The exemption provided to social clubs under section 501(c)(7)
extends only to "exempt function" income which generally includes
income derived directly from the membership and amounts set aside
for charitable and similar purposes.' 9 All other income, including in-
vestment income, will be subject to tax as unrelated business taxable
income.20 In order to be exempt from tax, the "exempt function"
income must meet a two part test: (1) the income must be generated
from providing "exempt function" facilities, and (2) the income
must be received from the membership. 21 For example, where a
country club qualifying for section 501(c)(7) treatment receives
membership dues, food concession income, and greens fees from both
members and nonmembers as well as interest income received from a
member paying back a loan to the country club, the nonmember
15. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (1989).
16. See S. REP. No. 152, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 71 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1969).
17. See generally I.R.C. § 61 (1989).
18. Should a social club fail to qualify for exemption under section 501(c)(7),
section 277 will generally apply. Under section 277, deductions attributable to furnishing
services, insurance, goods, or other items to the members will be allowed only to the
extent of income derived during the year from members or transactions with members.
Any excess deductions will be carried over to succeeding taxable years. Thus, under sec-
tion 277, investment income or nonmember receipts may not be used to defray all or a
part of the cost of providing services to members and thereby escape tax. I.R.C. § 277
(1989).
19. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(B) (1989).
20. See id.
21. TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12, at 324.
food concession and greens fees income as well as the loan proceeds 22
would not qualify as "exempt function" income and thus would be
subject to tax on unrelated business income.23
The test for taxation of income and allowance of deductions for a
section 501(c)(7) organization is a special rule found in section
512(a)(3)(A).24 Section 512(a)(3)(A) generally provides that a sec-
tion 501(c)(7) organization's taxable income is equal to its gross in-
come excluding "exempt function" income minus allowable deduc-
tions directly connected with the production of such gross income,
again excluding the "exempt function" income.2 5 Assume a club in-
curs food concession income from members and nonmembers, greens
fees from members and nonmembers, and interest income. In addi-
tion, assume the club incurs expenses in the form of nonmember
food preparation costs, employee salaries, utilities, depreciation on
the club premises, and expenses relating to the interest income. As
stated above, the nonmember concession and green fees income,
along with the interest income, would not qualify for "exempt func-
tion" income treatment and, thus, would be included in the section
512(a)(3)(A) equation. Assuming the above stated expenses are all
otherwise allowable, only those expenses directly connected with the
production of gross income (excluding "exempt function" income)
would go into the section 512(a)(3)(A) equation. Therefore, the in-
terest expense and the food preparation costs would be allowed as
deductions against the organization's taxable income as they are
both directly connected with the production of nonexempt function
gross income. In addition, that portion of the expenses for salaries,
utilities, and depreciation which are allocable to nonmember food
preparation and other nonmember service income will also be in-
cluded. Those expenses allocable to providing "exempt function" ser-
vices to members would not be included in the equation. The result-
ing figure constitutes unrelated business taxable income and is
therefore subject to tax.
In the above example, it was assumed that the listed expenses
were otherwise allowable under the Code.26 Whether or not such ex-
penses are otherwise allowable is a hotly debated topic which is the
subject of a substantial amount of recent litigation.27 In this regard,
22. Although these amounts would meet the second part of the two part test since
they are received from the membership, they would not qualify under the first part since
they are not received in exchange for "exempt function" facilities. Id.
23. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1989).
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. Section 501(a)(3)(A) requires that for deductions to be allowable under sec-
tion 501(c)(7), they must also be allowable under some other provision of chapter one of
the Code.
27. See, e.g., North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 563, 579
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the primary issues addressed by the courts are whether a social club
may net excess expenses attributable to an income generating activ-
ity against income from passive investments, and more particularly,
whether social clubs must show a profit motivation as to the income
generating activities for excess deductions to be allowable against
other income. 8
IV. ALLOWABILITY OF EXCESS DEDUCTIONS AGAINST INTEREST
INCOME
A. Revenue Ruling 81-69
The issue of excess deductions for multiple nonexempt activities
was first addressed by the Internal Revenue Service (Service) in
Revenue Ruling 81-69.29 That ruling involved a social club which
had unrelated business taxable income from both investment income
and from sales of food and beverages to nonmembers. 0 The club's
sales of food and beverages to nonmembers over the years were at
prices which were consistently insufficient to recover the costs of
such sales, and there were indications that such sales would continue
to result in losses for the club. 31
Applying section 162 of the Code,32 the Service held that the food
and beverage sales did not constitute ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.3 3 The Service
noted that one requirement for a trade or business for the purposes
of a section 162 deduction is a, profit motivation, whether or not the
activity is being conducted by a tax exempt organization or a profit
making organization.34 The Service held there was no profit motive
(1987), rev'd, 877 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833,
838 (2d Cir. 1986); Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States, 799 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th
Cir. 1985); Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351.
28. See supra note 27.
29. Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Note that section 512(a)(3) of the Code provides that unrelated business tax-
able income is determined by subtracting from the gross income, the deductions allowed
by chapter one of the Code. The deduction section most appropriate under these facts is
section 162 since a taxpayer engaged in an activity which is not a trade or business may
generally take deductions only up to the amount of the income generated by the activity
under either section 212 or section 183.
33. Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351.
34. Id. Note, however, that for this proposition, the Service cites Iowa State Univ.
of Science and Technology v. United States, 500 F.2d 508 (Ct. Cl. 1974), which was a
section 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization and thus was governed by section 512(a)(1),
not section 512(a)(3)(A).
in this case because the prices were not sufficient to recover costs. 35
Thus, for purposes of computing unrelated business taxable income,
the social club was barred from deducting from its net investment
income or its losses from the food sales to nonmembers.36
B. Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States
The position of the Service as espoused in Revenue Ruling 81-69,
was expressly rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States.37 Cleveland Athletic in-
volved a social club which derived unrelated business income from
two sources: investments and nonmember sales of food and beverages
on the club premises. With regard to the sales of food and beverages
to nonmembers, the club incurred what the court described as "di-
rect expenses" consisting of "[the] cost of goods sold, salaries, and
other directly related expenses . "... 38 The club also incurred "in-
direct expenses" consisting of "items such as rent, insurance, and
depreciation." 39 The court indicated that these latter expenses were
"fixed expenses" which would have been incurred whether or not the
club served nonmembers.40 During the years at issue, although the
gross receipts from nonmember sales exceeded the direct expenses, a
net loss resulted when the indirect expenses were allocated to the
nonmember sales.4'
The Commissioner, relying on Revenue Ruling 81-69, argued un-
35. Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 C.B. 351.
36. Id.
37. 779 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 1161.
39. Id.
40. Id. In order to determine the amount properly deductible from unrelated busi-
ness income, the fixed expenses were allocated, without objection from the government,
based on the ratio that nonmember sales bore to total sales. Id.
41. Id. The unrelated business taxable income for the Cleveland Athletic Club for
years in question is broken down into gross income and expenses as follows:
1975 1976 1977 1978
Inv* F/B** Inv F/B Inv F/B Inv F/B
Gross Income 34.3*** 184.5 35.9 117.2 36.9 246.2 42.4 135.8
Direct Costs -0- 108.6 -0- 80.4 -0- 166.7 -0- 94.7
Gross Profit 34.3 75.9 35.9 36.8 36.9 79.5 42.4 41.2
Indirect
Expenses -0- 120.2 -0- 68.5 -0- 131.4 -0- 78.5
Net Income 34.3 (44.3) 35.9 (31.8) 36.9 (51.9) 42.4 (37.3)
Total
Gain/Loss (10.0) 4.1 (15.0) 5.0
* Investment income
** Income from sales of food and beverages to non-members
* Thousands of dollars
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successfully "that each unrelated business activity must be consid-
ered separately and not aggregated" and that each activity must
meet the requirements of section 162(a) of the Code in order for
that activity's deductions to be allowable against other unrelated
business activities.42 The Commissioner noted that one of the re-
quirements of section 162 is that the activity for which a deduction
is sought is undertaken with a profit motive.43 The Commissioner
argued that no such motive was present in this case as evidenced by
the losses present in all of the years in question."
The court first considered the definition of "unrelated business
taxable income" as applied to social clubs found in section
512(a)(3)(A). ' It noted that this definition was markedly different
from the general rule which applies to charities and other tax ex-
empt organizations. 46 The court indicated that the "salient differ-
ence" between the two sections is that section 513(a)(3), which per-
tains to social clubs,
begins by computing gross income in general, excepts exempt function in-
come and then subtracts deductions connected with the production of gross
income. The general section (Sec. 512(a)(1)) begins with gross income from
unrelated trade or business only, and subtracts deductions connected with
Id.
42. Id. at 1162-63.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1164. Note, however, that in Revenue Ruling 81-69, the Service states
that the prices were "insufficient to recover the costs" of providing food and beverages to
nonmembers. It is not clear from this statement of fact whether the prices were sufficient
to recover the direct costs as was the case in Cleveland Athletic. Rev. Rul. 81-69, 1981-1
C.B. 351, 352.
45. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165.
46. Id. The general definition of "unrelated business taxable income" is found in
section 512(a)(1) of the Code, which provides as follows:
(1) GENERAL RULE.-Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the
term "unrelated business taxable income" means the gross income derived by
any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in section
513) regularly carried on by it, less the deddctions allowed by this chapter
which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business,
both computed with the modifications provided in subsection (b).
I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (1989). The definition of "unrelated business taxable income" for
purposes of section 501(c)(7) organizations appears in section 512(a)(3)(A), which
provides:
(A) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of an organization described in section
501(c)(7) or (9), the term "unrelated business taxable income" means the
gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions al-
lowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the
gross income (excluding exempt function income), both computed with the
modifications provided in paragraphs (6), (10), (11) and (12) of subsection (b)
I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1989).
the carrying on of such trade or business.47
The Sixth Circuit determined that this difference was intentional on
the part of the legislature, and that as a result, the trade or business
requirement of section 162(a), and thus the profit motive test, was
not required for deductibility of expenses of unrelated business activ-
ities of social clubs.48 Instead, the court indicated that deductions
will be allowable for purposes of the section 512(a)(3)(A) equation
so long as they were "ordinary and necessary to the production of
income" and where the activity involved had a "basic purpose of eco-
nomic gain."'49 Although it is not entirely clear from the language of
the opinion, it appears the court intended to establish a new generic
standard of deductibility of expenses for section 501(c)(7)
organizations."
In support of this generic standard, the court cited the Depart-
ment of the Treasury's Tax Reform Studies and Proposals"1 which
states "that all income other than exempt function income would be
included in gross income regardless of whether the activity generat-
ing the gross income met the requirements of a 'trade or business
regularly carried on.' "52 The court also cited the publication for the
proposition that "to remain consistent, 'deductions would be allowa-
ble if directly connected with an activity generating income subject
to tax, rather than only if directly connected with an unrelated trade
or business regularly carried on.' "53
In discussing the profit motivation issue, the court stated that it
did not believe that the nonmember business activities generate a
"tax profit" in order for excess deductions to be allowable.5 4 Al-
though the court never defines this term, one must presume it would
describe a situation where a net taxable income would result after
,47. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The opinion suggests that the court intended this as a generic test to be ap-
plied where nonexempt gross income is generated, whether passive investment or service
providing activity. The facts of the case suggest that the economic gain test would re-
quire a showing of income beyond the direct expenses but not the indirect expenses of a
particular activity.
51. TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12.
52. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165 (quoting TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra
note 12, at 324).
53. Id. at 1166 (quoting TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12, at 325). The court
also cited Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.512(a)-3(b)(3), now withdrawn, which re-
quired aggregation of both gross unrelated business income and deductions allowed with
respect to such gross income. Id. Although the proposed regulations were withdrawn on
January 26, 1987, the withdrawal should have little effect on the Sixth Circuit's opinion
since the court stated the proposed regulations had no legal force and effect, and were
merely indicative of the intentions of the Treasury. Id.
54. Id. at 1165. See infra notes 90-135 and accompanying text for discussion of
the tax profit issue.
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subtracting both "direct" and "indirect" deductions.5 5 The court fur-
ther cites Trustees of Graceland Cemetery Improvement Fund v.
United States56 for the proposition that "the profit factor" is only
significant where it is a means of distinguishing between an activity
carried on in good faith as a trade or business and an activity carried
on merely as a hobby.57 The court noted that in this case the activi-
ties were clearly not carried on as a hobby.5
C. Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner
A different approach was taken by the Second Circuit in Brook,
Inc. v. Commissioner,59 which involved a similar situation to the one
considered by the Cleveland Athletic court. In Brook, a social club
qualifying under section 501(c)(7) for tax exempt status had unre-
lated business taxable income consisting of investment income and
food and beverage sales to nonmembers. ° In regard to the food and
beverage sales, deductions consisting of both direct expenses and
properly allocable overhead costs exceeded the income received from
such sales for every year of an eleven year period, including the
years at issue.61 In addition, the taxpayer stipulated that it did not
intend to sell food and beverages to nonmembers at prices which
would exceed all costs, including overhead.
The Second Circuit held that the excess deductions from losses
suffered from the taxpayer's serving of meals to nonmembers were
not deductible against the social club's investment income because
the taxpayer had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 162.6
The court noted that in order for an activity to qualify as a "trade or
business" under section 162 it is well established that the taxpayer
must engage in the activity with the intention of making a profit. 4
55. This definition of tax profit is consistent with that put forth by the Tax Court
in North Ridge Country Club v. Commission, 89 T.C. 563 (1987), rev'd, 877 F.2d 750
(9th Cir. 1989). See infra notes 104-05.
56. 515 F.2d 763 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
57. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165. This is perhaps an unfortunate case to
cite for this proposition. The Trustees of Graceland decision involved the issue of
whether a subsidiary enterprise assumes the tax status and profit motive of its controlling
parent so that it could take deductions under section 162. See Brook, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 799 F.2d 833, 839 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986).
58. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165.
59. 799 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1986).
60. Id. at 835.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 838.
64. Id.
The court noted that the taxpayer stipulated it had no profit motive
and thus the profit motive test of section 162 was not satisfied.65
The court considered, but rejected, the economic gain test advo-
cated by the Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Athletic.6 Among the
court's reasons were the facts that the economic gain test is not a
requirement found in any presently existing deduction section, and
that section 512(a)(3)(A) specifically required a deduction to be "al-
lowed by this chapter" in order to be deductible against gross income
under 512(a)(3)(A) .67 In addition, the Brook court rejected the
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the meaning of the differences be-
tween the two definitions of "unrelated business taxable income" in
sections 512(a)(1) and 512(a)(3)(A). 8
The Brook court thought that section 162 was incorporated by
reference in section 512(a)(3)(A) since section 162 is the only sec-
tion which would have allowed a social club to deduct excess deduc-
tions against investment income.69 The court stated that the Sixth
Circuit's economic gain test was incorrect in allowing a taxpayer to
deduct expenses arising from activities which it did not engage in for
profit so long as the club engaged in the activity with a basic purpose
of economic gain.7 ° To do so would be, in the view of the Second
Circuit, to allow a taxpayer to completely bypass the requirements of
section 162.11
D. Profit Motivation
Cleveland Athletic stands for the proposition that a profit motiva-
tion need not be shown for section 501(c)(7) organizations in order
for excess deductions from one unrelated business activity to be al-
lowable against interest income.7 2 Instead, the court argued in favor
of a generic test whereby a social club need only show a "basic pur-
pose of economic gain" in order for an expense to be allowable as a
deduction.73 To support this proposition, the Sixth Circuit cited leg-
islative history stating that "'deductions would be allowable if di-
rectly connected with an activity generating income subject to tax,
rathey than only if directly connected with an unrelated trade or bus-




68. Id. at 840.
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id. at 839.
71. Id.
72. Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States, 779 F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir.
1985).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1166 (quoting TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12, at 325).
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to support this new generic standard of deductibility, it could equally
be read to indicate that the purpose of section 512(a)(3)(A) was to
broaden the type of deductions allowable.7 5 The latter view is more
consistent with the purposes for which section 512(a)(3)(A) was
enacted.16
There are several policy and statutory difficulties with the Sixth
Circuit's approach in Cleveland Athletic. One difficulty with the
court's new generic standard is its interpretation of the differences
between the two definitions of "unrelated business taxable income"
in sections 512(a)(1) and 512(a)(3)(A). 7 The Sixth Circuit was
concerned that to apply section 162 literally to social clubs would
read the "trade or business" requirement back into section
512(a)(3)(A) . However, the Second Circuit correctly reasoned that
the difference in the two definitions was rooted in Congress's intent
to tax entities such as social clubs more comprehensively than chari-
table and religious organizations and not to grant some sort of addi-
tional benefit to social clubs. 9
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Brook was that it was Con-
gress's purpose to "[tailor] the deductions allowable to each type of
organization according to the income to be taxed."80 Therefore, since
section 512(a)(1) organizations are taxed only on "trade or busi-
ness" income, the allowable deductions under section 512(a)(1) are
only those deductions "'directly connected with the carrying on of
that trade or business.' "81 In contrast, the income of a social club is
taxed more broadly and a larger array of deductions are available,
therefore the elimination of "trade or business" merely allows .a sec-
tion 512(a)(3)(A) organization to use section 162 or 212 or some
other available deduction."2
A second difficulty with the Cleveland Athletic court's economic
gain test is that it is not consistent with the legislative history of
section 512(a)(3)(A), which states:
75. For example, deductions incurred in obtaining interest income. This statement
of legislative purpose is probably referring to the fact that a broader range of income is
being taxed with regard to social clubs thus a broader range of deductions should be
allowed. With regard to other tax exempt organizations, only trade or business income is
taxed, thus only trade or business deductions are allowable.
76. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
77. See Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 840 (2d Cir. 1986).
78. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1165.
79. See Brook, 799 F.2d at 840.
80. Id. at 841.
81. Id.
82. Id.
[T]he tax exemption [for social clubs] operates properly only when the
sources of income of the organization are limited to receipts from the mem-
bership. Under such circumstances, the individual is in substantially the
same position as if he had spent his income on pleasure or recreation...
without the intervening separate organization.83
It was the purpose of section 512(a)(3)(A) to allow individuals to
join together for recreation or pleasure on a mutual basis without
further tax consequences than if they acted on an individual basis.84
However, it would clearly be contrary to legislative intent to allow
social clubs greater advantages than other taxpayers merely because
they chose to operate as a social club.
In allowing social clubs to deduct section 162 expenses without
requiring a showing of profit motivation, the Sixth Circuit's view
would result in precisely the preferential treatment sought to be
avoided by the enactment of section 512(a)(3)(A). For example, if a
taxpayer individually owns a horse and receives investment income, a
profit motivation would have to be shown in order for excess deduc-
tions for maintenance of the horse to be allowable against the invest-
ment income.8 Compare the above example with a riding club quali-
fying as a tax exempt social club which incurs some taxable income
from nonmember riding fees. Under the Cleveland Athletic analysis,
profit motive would not have to be shown for excess deductions to be
allowable. Therefore, if the Cleveland Athletic standard is adopted,
a taxpayer who chooses to operate as a tax exempt social club will
have a significant advantage over a taxpayer who operates merely as
an individual.8 6
A third difficulty with the Sixth Circuit's economic gain test is the
fact that section 512(a)(3)(A) explicitly requires deductions to be
83. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 71 (1969).
84. See id. at 71; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 47 (1969).
85. This hypothetical would clearly fall within section 183 unless the taxpayer
could show his ownership of the horse constituted a trade or business under section 162
which, in turn, requires a showing of profit motivation.
86. The Brook court noted that under the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, social clubs
would be permitted to take deductions from a particular activity regardless of the
amount of income generated by the underlying activity. Brook, 799 F.2d 833, 840. This
is perhaps too broad a reading since the taxpayer in Cleveland Athletic was able to show
gross income in excess of "direct costs" as defined by the Sixth Circuit. Cleveland Ath-
letic Club v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 1160, 1161 (6th Cir. 1985). Under Cleveland Ath-
letic, the club would not have unbridled discretion as to pricing of services to nonmem-
bers as suggested by the Brook opinion, but rather would have to show a basic purpose of
economic gain. It is not clear from the language of Cleveland Athletic whether in all
cases a social club would have to set prices sufficiently high to cover at least the direct
costs of such services as defined in the opinion. However, the court's emphasis on the fact
that the social club did satisfy this requirement suggests that the direct versus indirect
costs analysis is a central factor in the Sixth Circuit's economic gain test. Nevertheless,
the economic gain test would appear to allow social clubs to take a section 162 deduction
for expenses incurred in activities not engaged in for profit which would result in giving
social clubs a tax advantage not enjoyed by other taxpayers.
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allowable under some provision of chapter one of the Code.8 7 Cleve-
land Athletic does not directly address this issue, but appears to ac-
cept the argument advanced by the amicus curiae that the purpose
of the "'allowed by this chapter'" language in section 512(a)(3)(A)
is to require that deductions must satisfy the requirements of some
provision of chapter one of the Code, not necessarily limited to sec-
tion 162.88 Without citing alternative authority for allowance, the
court in Cleveland Athletic states that "the challenged deductions
need not necessarily come within the [section] 162 trade or business
allowance, but rather, the deductions are allowable as ordinary and
necessary to the production of income with a basic purpose of eco-
nomic gain." 9 Assuming that the Sixth Circuit meant to establish a
new generic standard of deduction for all section 512(a)(3)(A) orga-
nizations, this new standard appears to be contradictory to the re-
quirement that deductions be allowed by some provision of chapter
one of the code.
The Sixth Circuit's economic gain test is not supported by the
wording of the statute, legislative history, or the policies behind the
enactment of section 512(a)(3)(A). Therefore, if it was the Sixth
Circuit's intent to establish a new generic test which would supplant
the profit motivation test of section 162, the Sixth Circuit's view
ought to be rejected.
V. TAX PROFIT CONCEPT
The Tax Court in North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner,90
recently put forth an interesting twist on the approach taken by the
Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Athletic. Although recently reversed on
appeal, the Tax Court's approach in North Ridge is of continuing
interest both because of its novelty and because it may be used in
other circuits. 91 The case involved a golf club qualified under section
501(c)(7) as a social club, which had extensive unrelated business
activities generally categorized into three different areas.92 First, the
87. I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1989).
88. Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1164.
89. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added).
90. 89 T.C. 563 (1987), rev'd, 877 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989).
91. Under the "Golsen rule," the Tax Court does not consider itself bound by one
circuit if the case is appealable to another circuit. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affid. on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971).
92. North Ridge, 89 T.C. at 565. The parties themselves originally stipulated to a
different classification of activities which the Tax Court termed "misleading and contrary
93
club allowed its facilities to be used for a number of nonmember golf
tournaments which were held on days when the facilities were closed
to members.9 3 The second general source of nonmember revenue was
from food and beverage sales from nonmember banquets, other than
those associated with tournaments."4 These banquets occurred once
or twice a month during the year and more often during the Christ-
mas season. 95 Third, the club received substantial interest income.90
In addition, the prices paid by nonmembers for the use of petitioner's
facilities were substantially higher than those charged to members. 97
During the year at issue, the taxpayer incurred expenses which
were characterized by the court as either "direct" or "indirect" ex-
penses. 98 Direct expenses, which were directly proportional to the
volume of a particular nonmember activity, were "traceable to the
particular activity and would not have been incurred but for the ac-
tivity." 99 "Indirect expenses" according to the court, were either
fixed or "quasi-fixed." 100 In the category of fixed expenses, the court
included property taxes and depreciation which were incurred
whether or not the nonmember activity occurred. 10 1 Among the
"quasi-fixed" expenses, the court included utilities, general adminis-
tration, and club house expenses which were subject to increase by
nonmember activity but the increase was nominal or not easily allo-
cable.102 Although the gross receipts from the nonmember activities
exceeded the direct expenses, a net loss resulted when the indirect
expenses were allocated to those nonmember activities.0 3
The Tax Court held that the excess deductions from the nonmem-
to facts disclosed by the record as a whole." Id. at 571.
93. Id. at 566.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 564, 565.
97. Id. at 567. For example, in 1979, the cost of a mandatory golf cart for mem-
bers and guests was $9 or $10, and the cost to tournament participants was $10 or $11.
Although members were not charged greens fees per se, the greens fees charged to mem-
bers for their guests was $7.50 for 1979, while the charge to tournament participants was
$11. Id.




102. Id. The court cited, for example, utility expenses which were billed based on
total usage. The court noted that it would be a "difficult if not impossible task to know
how many kilowatt hours were attributable to each unrelated business activity." id. at
565 n.5.
103. The parties stipulated with regard to revenues and expenses for 1979 as
follows:
Golf Golf Carts Food Bar Guest Fees
Revenue 13,170 11,819 39,281 43,406 1,015
Direct
Expenses 8,820 3,975 43,389 28,389 -0-
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ber tournament and banquet activities could be used to offset the
interest income received by the club. 04 The court determined that
both the banquet and tournament activities were entered into with
the purpose of producing a profit.105 In holding that a profit motiva-
tion existed, the Tax Court was able to distinguish Brook because
the taxpayer in that case stipulated that a profit motive did not
exist.'0 6
The North Ridge case ,is remarkable in that the Tax Court re-
jected taxable profit as the focus for determining profit motivation107
Instead, the Tax Court analyzed profit motivation from "the stand-



































11,893 8,359 57,855 44,211 202
Net Income 1,277 3,460 (18,574) (805) 813
Id. at 565. The court recategorized the above figures in terms of the two general areas of
nonmember golf tournaments and banquets. Id. at 572. After subtracting direct costs,
the court determined that the following revenues were generated by the two activities:
Golf Tournaments:
G reens .........................................
G olf Carts ......................................
G uest Fees ......................................
Banquets (Food and Bar) .........................
Banquet:








* The Court was unable to allocate the food and bar revenues between those
banquets associated with the golf tournaments and those standing alone.
104. Id. at 579.
105. Id. at 572.
106. Id. at 577.
107. Id. at 572.
payer]."108 The court was not concerned with fixed costs such as de-
preciation and overhead which the taxpayer would incur whether the
taxpayer conducted the activities in question.109 Instead, the court
measured "profit" by "each dollar earned over and above the direct
costs of each activity." l 0 Therefore, as the social club was receiving
proceeds from each activity which exceeded the direct costs from
such activity, the court held that a profit motivation existed."'
In applying the profit motivation test to the activities in question,
the Tax Court in North Ridge was implicitly applying Section 162,
and not the economic gain test of Cleveland Athletic. However, the
Tax Court's application of the profit motive test of 162 was remarka-
bly similar to the Sixth Circuit's application of its economic gain
test. In both Cleveland Athletic and North Ridge, the courts explic-
itly rejected tax profit as the measuring rod for allowing excess de-
ductions from one activity to be used against another unrelated busi-
ness activity.1 2 Both cases drew a distinction between direct and
indirect expenses, with the latter described as fixed expenses which
would have been incurred whether the club participated in the rele-
vant activity or not."13 In addition, in both cases income from the
unrelated business activity exceeded direct expenses, but when indi-
rect expenses such as depreciation, insurance, or administrative fees
were added in, excess deductions resulted." 4 Thus, the result under
Sixth Circuit's view is virtually identical to that of the Tax Court's
decision in North Ridge.
In contrast, the Second Circuit in Brook, never defined the nature
of the "profit motive" test it applied. However, there are indications
from the facts that "tax profit" was the determining factor. In its
stipulation of facts, the taxpayer conceded that it "did not sell food
and beverages to nonmembers with an intention that revenues from
such sales would exceed all costs relating to such sales including
overhead.""l 5 The Brook court concluded from this stipulation that
the taxpayer agreed it did not intend to obtain a profit, which indi-
108. Id.
109. Id. This view is in direct opposition to the Service's position in recent letter
rulings. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-08-004 (Nov. 16, 1984), wherein the Service
stated that "when considering the factor of whether costs consistently exceed income [for
purposes of profit motivation analysis], all costs should be taken into account, including
such items as depreciation and overhead." Id.
110. North Ridge, 89 T.C. at 572.
111. Id. at 573. This approach is virtually identical to the economic gain test of
Cleveland Athletic. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
112. See Cleveland Athletic Club v. United States, 779 F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir.
1985); North Ridge, 89 T.C. at 572.
113. See Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1161; North Ridge, 89 T.C. at 565.
114. See Cleveland Athletic, 779 F.2d at 1162 n.3; North Ridge, 89 T.C. at 565.
115. Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 835 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
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cates that the Second Circuit considers overhead relevant to the
analysis of profit motive."' Thus, presumably, even if the taxpayer
in Brook was able to show it intended to charge nonmembers a suffi-
cient amount to cover the direct expenses of providing the service, if
the amount charged was not sufficient to cover overhead or other
"fixed expenses," the Second Circuit would hold that the taxpayer
did not have a sufficient profit motive to satisfy section 162."1
On hearing the North Ridge appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted
the Brook court's opinion and rejected the Tax Court's analysis of
profit motivation." 8 The Ninth Circuit held that a club "can prop-
erly deduct losses from a nonmember activity only if it undertakes
that activity with the intent to profit, where profit means the produc-
tion of gains in excess of all direct and indirect costs." 1 9 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the tax profit analysis criticized by both the
Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit. As a rationale for its opinion, the
Ninth Circuit cited essentially the same legislative history arguments
which the Brook court used against the Sixth Circuit's economic
benefit rule.'20
There is no clear case law support for the Ninth Circuit's view
that the intention to realize a profit means intention to realize a tax
profit.' 2' To the contrary, in Leamy v. Commissioner, 22 it was held
that "profit" for purposes of section 162 means "economic profit,"
independent of tax savings. 23 In analyzing whether tax profit is the
116. Id.
117. The facts of Brook were not sufficiently delineated to speculate as to whether
the taxpayer charged a sufficient amount to cover direct expenses, or even whether the
overhead expenses were of the same type of "fixed" expenses described by the courts in
Cleveland Athletic and North Ridge. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
118. North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. Id. at 756 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 752-54. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Tax Court's analysis of the
profit motive test would allow certain income, such as investment income, to go untaxed.
The court indicated that these revenues would be used toward the operation of the club,
and felt that such a use of these untaxed revenues "is manifestly the sort of tax-free
subsidy to social club members that section 512(a) sought to prevent." Id. at 756.
121. Some cases have appeared to use tax profit as a measuring stick. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1981); Lamont v. Commissioner,
339 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1964). However, those cases did not involve a situation where
the activity to be measured was closely tied to a tax exempt activity. Further, in Hirsch
v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1963), it was held that one test of carrying on a
trade or business is that the taxpayer must have a "dominant hope and intent of realizing
a profit, i.e. taxable income. . . ." Id. at 736. However, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in
North Ridge, 877 F.2d at 756 n.9, the Hirsch court was not presented with the problem
of economic gain versus taxable profit, thus this statement is dicta.
122. 85 T.C. 798 (1985).
123. Id. at 808. In both Cleveland Athletic and North Ridge, the taxpayer re-
salient factor in determining profit motivation, it should be
remembered that profit motive, for purposes of section 162, is not a
statutory requirement.1 24 Instead, it has been read into section 162
through numerous cases.' 2
The profit motive test has generally been applied by reviewing all
the relevant facts and circumstances of each case.128 No one test is
exclusive, and courts have applied a number of factors in determin-
ing if the taxpayer's activities were engaged in for profit.127 Among
the factors applied are:
(1) [The] manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity... (2) The
expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors . . . (3) The time and effort ex-
pended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. .. (4) The expectation
that assets used in activity may appreciate in value. .. (5) The success of
the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities . . . (6)
The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity
(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned... (8) The
financial status of the taxpayer . . . (9) Elements of personal pleasure or
recreation.1 2
8
The Ninth Circuit's approach fails to take into account these vari-
ous traditional factors, and instead focuses solely on the expectation
of a taxable profit. Assuming arguendo that taxable profit, rather
than economic profit, is the proper standard, this single factor ap-
proach promises to be inflexible and unwise if applied outside the tax
exempt social club context. For example, in the context of multiple
businesses owned by a single taxpayer, taxable profit may not be the
proper focus, or at least should not be the sole focus of the reviewing
court.121
ceived money which exceeded the direct costs of the service provided. See supra notes
105-08 and accompanying text. Therefore, using the Leamy approach, when the tax ef-
fects of allocable depreciation and utilities and other fixed costs are removed, arguably
an economic profit results.
124. See generally I.R.C. § 162 (1989).
125. See id.; see also Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir.),
affid, 722 F.2d 695 (1984); Carter v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1981);
Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1964); Adirondack League Club v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 796, 809 (1971), affd, 458 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1972).
126. See Brannen, 722 F.2d at 704.
127. Id.
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1989). Note that although section 183 technically
does not apply until a determination is made that the requirements of section 162 are not
met, courts have relied on these factors in analyzing profit motive under section 162.
Brannen, 722 F.2d at 704; Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 319-21 (1976).
129. For example, consider two businesses operated by a single taxpayer where
both businesses are operated out of the same facility. Assume one business is large and
one small and the smaller business is tied very closely to the large business and is occupy-
ing space which would not otherwise be used by the larger business. Assume further that
the smaller business would be entitled to a percentage of indirect expenses (as that term
is defined by the Tax Court in North Ridge) which otherwise would be entirely allocable
to the larger business. The allocation of the depreciation deduction might result in a net
zero or negative taxable profit for the smaller business, even though the smaller business
could expect a net positive economic profit. Thus, the use of a one factor tax profit stan-
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The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its definition of profit moti-
vation in North Ridge is not intended to apply generally and is lim-
ited to the unrelated businesses of tax exempt social clubs.' 30 It is
the opinion of this writer that the profit motive test of section 162
ought to be applied consistently throughout the Code. To do other-
wise would be to attempt to judicially legislate a modification in sec-
tion 162 to meet the policy needs surrounding the tax exemption of
social clubs. Thus, to the extent the North Ridge opinion suggests
that the multifactor approach should not be applied to tax exempt
social clubs, it frustrates uniform application. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit view ought not to be followed.' 3'
Assuming the multifactor approach is applied in the social club
context, there are a number of policy reasons favoring the Ninth
Circuit's tax profit analysis over the Tax Court's economic profit
analysis. By allowing a social club to utilize excess deductions for
services provided to nonmembers against investment income so long
as the prices for such services are above the expected direct costs as
the economic profit analysis does, a social club could conceivably
avoid paying any income tax at all. This is in direct contradiction to
the legislative purpose of section 512(a)(3)(A) which was to tax
such investment income.132 In addition, the Tax Court's version of
the profit motive test could result in social clubs structuring their
nonexempt activities to utilize investment income to subsidize the
services to nonmembers. 3 As noted by the Second Circuit in Brook,
such nonmembers are often friends of members, utilizing the services
of the club at the invitation of a member. 34
Nevertheless, despite these reservations and policy considerations,
the Tax Court's economic profit analysis continues to have vitality,
at least in jurisdictions outside of the Ninth and Second Circuits.
Although the Tax Court's view is inconsistent with the basic policies
dard could result in penalizing the taxpayer for operating the smaller business, even
though the indirect expenses would have been entirely allowable from a profit motive
standpoint had the smaller business not existed or had it operated in another facility.
130. North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir.
1989).
131. It is conceivable that this type of case-by-case approach may result in incon-
sistent treatment, and that some social clubs might satisfy a multifactor analysis which
does not test solely on taxable income.
132. TAx REFORM STUDIES, supra note 12, at 27.
133. The subsidizing aspect comes from the fact that deductions which would oth-
erwise be usable against interest income (i.e., depreciation on the club building, utility
expenses) would become usable merely because the club provides some services to
nonmembers.
134. Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1986).
surrounding the taxation of unrelated businesses of section 501(c) (7)
organizations, there is at least as much case law support for the Tax
Court's economic profit factor as there is for the Ninth Circuit's tax
profit factor."3 5 Arguably the best solution to the continuing split of
authority between the Sixth Circuit and the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits would be for Congress to specifically delineate the conditions
for deductibility of expenses of tax exempt social clubs.13 Thus, this
author recommends that Congress should enact legislation to modify
section 512(a)(3)(A) to limit deductions attributable to nonmember
services to income from such activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's economic gain test, if meant to be a replace-
ment for section 162, is not supported by statute, case law, or legisla-
tive history, and ought to be rejected. In the alternative, Cleveland
Athletic may be read to merely provide a gloss on section 162 in the
context of section 512(a)(3)(A) organizations, whereby economic
profit, rather than tax profit, is the focus of deductibility. This latter
approach is similar to that taken by the Tax Court in North Ridge
which may still have validity in other circuits despite its reversal in
the Ninth Circuit.
While there is some case law support for this approach, several
policy objectives weigh against its continued application. Under the
North Ridge analysis, social clubs will be able to avoid taxation of
investment income merely by structuring nonexempt activities to
generate excess deductions which would not otherwise be allowable.
Further, a social club would be able to use such nontaxed investment
income to, in effect, subsidize nonmember services in direct contra-
vention of the legislative purposes in enacting section 512(a)(3)(A).
Congress should revisit this area and either limit the amount of
excess deductions a social club may use against investment income,
or provide a clarified profit motive standard to be used with section
512(a)(3)(A) requiring the intention to realize a "tax profit" with
regard to these activities.
135. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
136. Arguably, congressional action on this issue is preferable to a judicial solution
since a final resolution of this issue by the Supreme Court or otherwise might cause more
problems than are resolved. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
